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Uniformity of Commercial Law and
State-by-State Enactment: A
Confluence of Contradictions
By E. HUNTER TAYLOR, JR.*
Introduction
The drafting and state-by-state enactment of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code was heralded as a major milestone, if not the ultimate
solution, in the movement to make uniform the commercial laws of the
United States. It has proven, in most respects, to be an excellently
drafted statute. Yet, the Code, while producing more uniformity than
existed previously, is proving incapable of effecting the degree of har-
mony needed between the commercial laws of the various states.
Both the text and the silences of the Code contain important seeds
of nonuniformity. Some significant matters were simply not provided
for, thereby leaving the various states to reach their own solutions.
Other Code sections are worded in such a way as to delegate to each
state the choice of which, as between competing interpretations, it
wishes to embrace.' Drafting mishaps contribute to nonuniformity.
The unnecessary incompleteness in the formulation of legal rules and
the inadvertent adoption of vague, ambiguous and competing rules
produce inconsistent results in like cases.
Even with the most complete and consistent drafting possible,
however, and even with a total absence of choice delegation, uniform-
ity is improbable through the process of state-by-state enactment.
State-by-state enactment is an invitation to local amendments because
it gives each state legislature an opportunity to deviate from the "uni-
form" act. Unfortunately, the states have been unable to resist this
tempting invitation to amend. Thus, by the time the various states en-
* Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Camden. LL.B., 1965, Tulane University;
LL.M., 1969, Columbia University. I am deeply indebted to Jeanne A. Taylor, Esq. of the
New Jersey Bar and to Professor Edward E. Chase of the faculty of Rutgers.-Camden School
of Law for their valuable comments and suggestions during the preparation of this Article.
The very helpful research assistance of Gloria Burns and Sylvia Hahn is also gratefully
acknowledged.
1. See notes 32-35 & 38-48 & acco0mpanying text infra.
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acted the Code it ceased to be uniform. Local amendments are, how-
ever, only the first phase in the breakdown of uniformity. One kindred
consequence of state-by-state enactment is that the courts of each state
have primary responsibility for the interpretation of that state's code.
Interpretational mishaps and legitimate interpretational differences
are inescapable. With this legion of final arbiters, multiformity is
inevitable.
Attainment of more substantial uniformity in commercial law will
require significant federal participation in the effort and the accompa-
nying abandonment of the state-by-state enactment model. The de-
gree of federal participation might be as little as federal enactment of a
commercial code with major jurisdiction over its application vested in
the state courts. On the other hand, it could be in the form of a federal
code with jurisdiction over it vested in the federal judiciary. Various
interfusions of these models are possible and the choice of the most
appropriate model depends in large measure on the degree of uniform-
ity that is sought. While opinions may differ as to the optimum degree
of commercial law uniformity, prolonged Balkanization of commercial
law is the certain consequence of continuing down the present path of
state-by-state enactment.
A Brief History of the Movement to Make Uniform the
Commercial Laws of the Various States
The early development of commercial law in this country was pri-
marily influenced by English law. In spite of this consanguinity, how-
ever, substantive differences arose between the states. The differences
stemmed in part from disparate methods of receiving English law in
the states,2 varied perceptions of both the content and the meaning of
the content of that which was received, the outgrowth of different rules
from a common source, and diverse subsequent statutory enactments.
3
By the late nineteenth century, substantial variation existed among the
states. Because of these differences, there were calls for the enactment
of a federal code of commercial law to govern interstate commerce,
4
2. See generally Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its Reception in the United
States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951).
3. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 232-38, 464-74 (1973); Beutel,
The Development f/State Statutes On Negotiable Paper Prior to the Negotiable Instruments
Law, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 836 (1940); Beutel, Colonial Sources ofthe Negotiable Instruments
Law ofthe United States, 34 ILL. L. REv. 137 (1939).
4. See, e.g., Committee on Commercial Law, Report, in 10 A.B.A. REP. 332-44 (1887).
The common law was then perceived by the "liberal" constructionists as providing Congress
with jurisdiction over only those commercial transactions involving two or more states. In
1890 a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives "to regulate commerce among
the several states, and to codify the law relating to bills of exchange and other commercial
[Vol. 30
although others viewed such a code as beyond the scope of congres-
sional authority.
5
The movement to unify commercial law has been paradoxical
from the outset. While its proponents have sought uniformity, the
movement was born at the turn of the century at least partially out of
fear of federal legislation dictating uniformity. Forty years later, when
there was less reason for optimism on achieving homogeneity through
state-by-state accord, the Uniform Commercial Code was conceived in
response to the renewed threat of federal legislation.
The uniformity movement began in earnest with the organization
in 1892 of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.6 Their first major project was the drafting of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, which was recommended for adoption in
1896. The formulation of this Act began the succession of acts passed
in the first unsuccessful stage of the uniformity progression. Next, in
1906, the Uniform Sales Act was approved by the Commissioners.
This piecemeal approach continued with approval of the Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act (1906), the Uniform Bills of Lading Act
(1909), the Uniform Stock Transfer Act (1909), the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act (1918) and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (1933).7
Different pieces of uniform legislation were received with varying de-
grees of enthusiasm. For example, all states adopted the Uniform Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act and
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. Thirty-four states ultimately adopted
the Uniform Sales Act, while only ten states enacted the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act.8
The failure to obtain unanimous adoption of several of the acts
guaranteed that uniformity of commercial law would not be obtained.
Conflicting judicial interpretations were another, and perhaps ulti-
mately more alarming cause for the failure of the original movement.
For example, of the 198 sections of the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, 76 had been subjected to different interpretations by 1948.9
Finally, some of the uniform acts were changed by local amendment,
paper." H.R. 6957, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 21 CONG. REc. 1374 (1890). This bill apparently
died in the Judiciary Committee.
5. See Tompkins, The Necessity for Uniformity in the Laws Governing Commercial
Paper, in 13 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 247, 262 (1890).
6. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS (1892).
7. A summary of the state-by-state enactment of the uniform acts is located in HAND-
BOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 349-
52, 360-63 (1976).
8. Id.
9. See BEUTEL'S BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 89-92 n.40 (7th ed.
1948).
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thereby further frustrating the goal of uniformity. The first stage of
organized effort to obtain uniformity of commercial law was a
disappointment.
By 1940 there was again serious congressional agitation toward
federal legislation in the area of commercial law. During that year
Congressman Herron Pearson of Tennessee introduced the Federal
Sales Act in the House of Representatives.' 0 The alarm with which the
federal act was perceived appears from two statements made at the Fif-
tieth Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1940. President William A. Schnader, in his
opening address, declared:
If we are to be preserved from the epidemic of totalitarianism, which
seems to be sweeping the world, the powers reserved to the states
must be retained by them. But in order to be retained, they must be
exercised wisely and efficiently. And, certainly in matters affecting
the conduct of business on a nation-wide scale, efficient state govern-
ment can be conducted only under uniform state laws."l
President Schnader's concern was made more specific in a report of the
Uniform Commercial Acts Section by Professor Karl N. Llewellyn:
During the year, the Executive Committee appointed and attached to
the section a special committee ... for the purpose of dealing with
what had come to look like an emergency, to wit, the presence, with
heavy backing, of a proposed and pending federal bill. As a result
of that, your Committee got in touch with the people who were han-
dling and backing the proposed federal bill and induced them to
hold off until such action as this Conference might take at this
meeting.12
Later in the same meeting the Commissioners voted to begin work on a
Revised Uniform Sales Act which was to be drafted in such a way as to
make it suitable for incorporation in a comprehensive Uniform Com-
10. H.R. 8176, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). For an account of the several proposals
between 1922 and 1937 for federal legislation governing sales transactions in interstate com-
merce, see Thomas, The Federal Sales Bill as Viewed by the Merchant and the Practitioner, 26
VA. L. REv. 537, 542-45 (1940).
11. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 56 (1940).
12. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 89 (1940). This statement is somewhat puzzling in light of Professor Llewel-
lyn's position on the Federal Sales Act published earlier in the same year. "And it would
seem clear in consequence that to extend a Federal Sales Bill to cover interstate sales trans-
actions would be to further effectively, the work of simplifying and unifying the law gov-
erning such transactions. .. ."
"Nor is there any alternative workable procedure.. .. The only practicable road to real
uniformity in interstate sales transactions is by Congressional action, subject to the courts of
the United States for further authoritative development." Llewellyn, The Needed Federal
Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REv. 558, 561 (1940).
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mercial Code.' 3 In light of the work of this independent committee,
congressional consideration of the Federal Sales Act was delayed, and
work began on the second stage of the effort to obtain uniformity of
commercial law without federal legislation.
This second stage of the effort was to be time-consuming. Al-
though a comprehensive commercial code was contemplated from the
beginning, it was not until 1945, with the addition of the American Law
Institute and its financial resources, that the project was expanded from
a revised sales act to a commercial code. A final official draft was not
approved by the two sponsoring organizations until 1952, and only
Pennsylvania enacted this version of the Code. The New York Law
Revision Commission studied the version from 1953 until 1955 and
then recommended against its enactment in New York. Strongly influ-
enced by the criticisms and suggestions of the New York Law Revision
Commission, the editorial board produced a revised version of the
Code which was published early in 1958.14 By the end of 1961, thir-
teen states, including Pennsylvania, had enacted the 1958 Official Text
of the Code and the New York Law Revision Commission recom-
mended its adoption by the New York legislature.' 5 However, as a
harbinger of the current digressions from a uniform code, the New
York legislature made a number of changes in the 1958 text. The Per-
manent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code studied the
New York changes and the changes that had been made by other states
enacting the Code. The approved changes were incorporated in what
is called the 1962 Official Text of the Code. By 1967 every American
state except Louisiana had enacted this version of the Code.' 6 In 1972
the Permanent Editorial Board recommended a substantially amended
version of Article 9 on secured transactions. Thus far 23 states have
adopted the 1972 amendment of Article 9.17 The remainder continue
with the earlier version.'
The two versions of Article 9 currently in effect, in themselves,
create a significant diversity in commercial law.19 This, however, is
not the only disparity among the various states' enactments. As Mr.
13. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 166-67 (1940).
14. FARNSWORTH & HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW 7 (3d
ed. 1976).
15. Ad
16. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Unform Com-
mercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1967). Effective in 1975, Louisiana adopted Articles
1, 3, 4 and 5. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 10:1-101 to :5-117 (West Supp. 1978).
17. U.C.C. REP. SERV. Art. 9, at 1-3 (1978).
18. Except for Louisiana which has not adopted Article 9. Id at 1.
19. Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REv. 477 (1973).
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Schnader reported to the Annual Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1966, before the 1972 Amendment of Article 9:
Of the Code's 399 sections 195 have not been amended by any
Code jurisdiction. And 76 additional sections of the Code have been
amended by only a single state. This makes the picture look some-
what better but, nevertheless, the fact is that as the Code stands on
the statute books of 49 jurisdictions, it is not a uniform Code.20
Drafting and Interpretational Development of the
U.C.C.-Further Steps Away from Uniformity.
The nonuniformity produced by two versions of Article 9 and the
local amendments is compounded by the manner in which some of the
uniform portions of the Code were drafted and by the way in which
some courts have interpreted the Code. The present discussion exam-
ines the drafting and interpretation of Article 2 of the Code to deter-
mine the extent to which its theoretical potential for producing
uniformity could have been realized, and how it is, in fact, being
realized.
The reasons for this focus on Article 2 are threefold: First, the au-
thor does not have as his purpose to catalog all examples of
nonuniformity under the Code, but rather to suggest the types of
nonuniformity that are occuring; second, while Article 2 is perhaps
more "open-textured" in its content than any other article, its structure
is representative of the entire code; third, Article 2 is relied upon in
commercial transactions and cited by courts perhaps more frequently
than any other article of the Code.2 1
20. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 152 (1966).
21. Of an examined sample of 493 cases decided in 1970, 1971, 1974 and 1975 which
were reported in volumes 8, 9 and 16 of the U. CC. Reporting Service, 206 or 42% promi-
nently involved Article 2. Article 9 was prominently involved in 163 or 33%; Article 3 in 90
or 18%; Article 4 in 19 or 5%; Article 8 in 16 or 3%; Article 6 in 6 or 1%; Article 7 in 4 or less
than 1%; and Article 5 in 4 or less than 1%. The breakdown of cases by article equals more
than the total of 493. While an effort was made to determine which article was predomi-
nantly involved in each case, in some instances, of course, more than one article had to be
included as prominently involved. The breakdown of the survey for the two two-year peri-
ods involved is as follows:
Art. 2 Art. 9 Art. 3 Art. 4 Art. 8
1970-71 104 84 43 11 7
1974-75 102 79 47 8 9
Art. 6 Art. 7 Art. 5 Total Cases Surveyed
1970-71 2 1 0 247
1974-75 4 3 4 246
Professor J.J. White recently conducted an empirical study of three jurisdictions, each
surveyed for a one-year period. Professor White found 55 of 219 citations to Article 2
[Vol. 30
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Some of the more significant categories of diversity producing fac-
tors in the Code 2 will be illustrated in this Article by examples from




The drafters, in the general statement of purpose of the Code, call
for the liberal construction and application of the Act, "to make uni-
form the law among the various jurisdictions." 23 Yet total uniformity
on matters of significance was doomed at the outset by the drafters
themselves. A blatant example of almost direct sanctioning of
nonuniformity on a point of substantial importance is found in section
2-318 on third-party beneficiaries of warranties in the area of product
liability.
24
Under pre-Code law the issue of warranty and privity was in a
state of chaos. The confusion existed at two levels. The first con-
cerned veritcal privity: from whom in the vertical chain of distribution,
other than the buyer's immediate seller, did warranties run to the
buyer? Some jurisdictions held that warranty protection ran from re-
mote sellers such as manufacturers and wholesalers to the ultimate
sections were references to one of the warranty sections from § 2-313 to § 2-316. White,
Evaluating Article 2 of the Un/form Commercial Code: A Preliminary Empirical Expedition,
75 MICH. L. REv. 1262, 1269-70 (1977) [hereinafter cited as White]. From this data, Profes-
sor White concluded that the courts actually have dealt with Article 2 only sporadically. Id
at 1272. Another feasible interpretation of the data, however, is simply that a significant
percentage of Article 2 cases involve the warranty sections. Even if one assumes that Pro-
fessor White's data are accurate and that approximately 25% of all Article 2 cases deal pri-
marily with the warranty sections, the number of remaining cases remains quite significant.
In the present author's sample, there was a total of 206 Article 2 cases and 163 Article 9
cases. Subtracting 25% of the Article 2 cases still leaves 154 cases dealing with other sec-
tions of Article 2. This is significant in comparison with the numbers of cases construing
other articles. Article 9, though equally significant in terms of numbers of cases, is now less
appropriate for study because it has two official versions with many major differences. The
lack of uniformity surrounding Article 9 is briefly discussed in Henson, The Problem of
Uniformity, 20 Bus. LAW. 689 (1965); Kennedy, Federalism and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 29 Bus. LAw. 1225 (1974); and on a more general basis in Minahan, The Eroding
Uniformity of the Uniform Cormercial Code, 65 Ky. L.J. 799 (1977).
22. The author does not suggest that his categories are exhaustive. For example, an-
other potentially meaningful category of nonuniformity not explored in this Article is
nonuniformity resulting from differences in application of § 1-103 supplementary principles
of law and equity to Code transactions. See Young, Book Review, 66 COLuM. L. REV. 1571
(1966).
23. U.C.C. § 1-102(1), (2)(c). One can ponder whether there is any significance in the
order in which the basic "underlying purposes and policies" of the Act are set out in § 1-
102(2). On this subsection, see also note 115 infra.
24. U.C.C. § 2-318.
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buyer.25 Other jurisdictions held that lack of privity prevented recov-
ery by the buyer back against any party other than the immediate
seller.26 Still other jurisdictions continued to recognize privity as a
requisite in warranty actions, but utilized fictions to allow the buyer to
recover against remote sellers.27 A few jurisdictions were beginning to
replace traditional warranty reasoning with a strict tort liability theory,
under which neither privity nor disclaimers were relevant.
28
The second level of confusion, as to which the same degree of dis-
cord obtained, concerned horizontal privity: to whom apart from the
immediate buyer did the seller's warranty liability run?29 The tradi-
tional view was that the seller was not liable to anyone with whom he
had no contractual relationship. 30 Other courts utilized fictions to cir-
cumvent the privity requirement in this context. 31
25. See, e.g., Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930
(1938); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 105 Ohio App. 53, 139 N.E.2d 871 (1957), afj'd
as to breach of express warranty, 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); Jacob E. Decker
& Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
26. This strict requirement of privity evolved primarily from misinterpretations of
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 N. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), and was encouraged
by Bohen, The Basis of ffirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 44 AM. L. REG. (N.S.)
209, 280-85, 289-310 (1909). See, e.g., Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51,
112 A.2d 701 (1955).
27. See, e.g., Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90
S.W.2d 445 (1936) (retailer assigned its warranty from the manufacturer when it sold to
consumer); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928) (consumer
is a third-party beneficiary of the retailer's contract with the manufacturer and, alterna-
tively, retailer is an agent of the manufacturer when sale is made to consumer); Wisdom v.
Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 P. 1050 (1929) (retailer is consumer's agent when
purchase is made from the manufacturer). See generally Gillam, Products Liability in a
Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119 (1958) (29 theories).
28. Eg., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (in-
volved breach of warranty but rather clearly anticipated adoption of strict tort liability based
on public policy); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (first case clearly to apply strict liability in tort in products liability);
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 641-44 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer
in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
29. Vertical privity refers to the remote sellers (e.g., manufacturers and wholesalers)
who passed the goods through the chain of distribution down to the buyer's immediate
seller. Horizontal privity refers to those other than the actual buyer who are entitled to the
same warranty protection afforded the seller. For example, this group might include mem-
bers of the buyer's family, guests, or bystanders who are affected by the goods.
30. See, e.g., Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 129 F. Supp. 404 (D. Minn. 1955) (warranty
did not run to buyer's sister); Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927) (war-
ranty did not run to companion with whom buyer was travelling).
31. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr.
863 (1960) (injured party a third-party beneficiary of the contract of sale between buyer and
seller); Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316 (1943) (buyer purchases as agent for
injured party); Timmins v. F.N. Joslin Co., 303 Mass. 540, 22 N.E. 2d 76 (1939); Ryan v.
Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931) (agency theory). As is
[Vol. 30
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Against this background of confusion, the drafters were totally si-
lent on the important matter of vertical privity and took a most cau-
tious position on the issue of horizontal privity:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in per-
son by breach of the warranty.
32
Official Comment 3 explains:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the
section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the develop-
ing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
33
Left basically undisturbed, pre-Code lack of uniformity on warranty
matters continued.
In 1966 the Permanent Editorial Board added the two current ad-
ditional alternative versions of section 2-318. The first new alternative
extends the seller's warranty liability "to any natural person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty." 34 The second
alternative is even less restricted. It deletes the "natural person" limi-
tation and the requirement of personal injury, thereby extending the
coverage to business entities and allowing recovery for property loss. 3 5
Some states have now adopted each one of the alternatives. Other
states have substituted their own version of section 2-318. Most juris-
dictions have dropped the vertical privity requirement for recovery in
warranty; the requirement still remains in a few jurisdictions. To fur-
ther exacerbate the differences, a substantial number of jurisdictions
have simply replaced the warranty theory with strict tort liability as the
primary method for solving problems of product liability.36 Even
within the strict tort liability jurisdictions, the scope of the liability
often differs. Thus, Article 2 has not only not produced uniform prod-
frequently the case, the fictions sometimes led to outrageous results. In Gearing v. Berkson,
223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916), and in Hazelton v. First Nat'l Stores, 88 N.H. 409, 190
A. 280 (1937), the courts reasoned that an injured wife who had purchased defective food
had purchased in an agency capacity. Therefore, she was not a party to the contract of sale
and thus was not in privity with the seller as required for the successful maintenance of a
breach of warranty action.
32. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1958 version) (designated as Alternative A after 1966).
33. U.C.C. § 2-318, Official Comment 3 (1958 version) (emphasis added).
34. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative B (added in 1966 version).
35. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative C (added in 1966 version).
36. Reitz & Seabolt, Warranties and Product Liability: Who Can Sue and Where?, 46
TEMP. L.Q. 527, 531-33 (1973).
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ucts liability principles among the various states, 37 but it may also have
encouraged fruition of the discord which was present in prior case law.
Open delegation to the states, through incomplete drafting, is not
the only technique resulting in such conflicts. It has a covert sister: a
section can be drafted in such a way as to appear comprehensive and
certain but, at the same time, to invite significant differences in inter-
pretation. One example is section 2-202, which is the Article 2 pro-
nouncement of the parol evidence rule:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to
such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evi-
dence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agree-
ment but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by
course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete
and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
To appreciate the lack of uniformity that this section has generated, it
is only necessary to consider the wording of section 2-202 in light of the
various general contract theories of the parol evidence rule. Each such
theory has as its stated purpose ascertainment of the intent38 of the par-
ties. Perhaps the most frequently applied approach has been that of
Professor Williston, which determines the intended finality of a writing
by its appearance. If it appears final and complete on its face, the
parties intended it as final.39 Another widely used approach is that of
Professor Wigmore, who purported to reject the Willistonian approach:
"[I]ntent must be sought where always intent must be sought . .. ,
37. E.g., California did not enact § 2-318, preferring not to disturb the developing case
law. Bohn & Williams, California Code Comment at CAL. COM. CODE § 2318 (West 1964).
Illinois, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania remain with the 1958 version of§ 2-318. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 26, § 2-318 (Smith-Hurd 1962); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-318 (West 1962); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (Purdon 1970). New York amended its § 2-318 in 1975 to a
version similar to Alternative B of the 1966 version, N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney Supp.
1977). For a state-by-state compilation of rules, see Reitz & Seabolt, Warranties and Prod-
uct Liabilit: Who Can Sue and Where?, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 527 (1973). The significance of this
is pointed to by a recent empirical study by Professor JJ. White in which it was found that
approximately 25% of all Article 2 references in three jurisdictions during a one-year period
were to warranty sections. See note 22 supra.
38. The key as to intent, of course, is whether subjective or objective intent is the refer-
ent. Wigmore and Williston refer almost exclusively to objective. See notes 39 & 40 infra.
Corbin emphasizes subjective but gives the objective a role in proving subjective. See note
42 infra. As to the possibility of distortion of actual intent when objective intent is the
standard, see E.B. PASHUKANIS, THEORY OF LAW AND MARXISM IN SOVIET LEGAL PHILOS-
oPHY 187-88 (H.W. Babb trans. 1951); Franklin, A Precis of the American Law of Contract
for Foreign Civilians, 39 TUL. L. REv. 635, 635-44 (1965).
39. 4 WILISTON ON CONTRACTS § 633 (Jaeger ed. 1961).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
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namely, in the conduct and language of the parties and the surrounding
circumstances. The document alone will not suffice."''4 According to
Wigmore, the factor to determine whether to admit evidence of an ex-
trinsic agreement "is found in the circumstance whether or not the par-
ticular element of the alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in
the writing."4' In other words, the judge must categorize the extrinsic
agreement by subject matter, then must look to the writing to deter-
mine whether the subject is therein treated. If it is, the parties intended
the writing as final on that subject, and evidence of the extrinsic agree-
ment would not be admitted. A third approach was advanced by Pro-
fessor Corbin. He urged that the court actually attempt to ascertain
the intent of the contracting parties:
This is not to say that the defendant's testimony must be be-
lieved. Without doubt, the form of the instrument tends to corrobo-
rate the plaintiff. Surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the
parties should be given due consideration. The finding of the trial
court, with or without a jury, should seldom be set aside by an appel-
late court. But the court should not dodge the determination of the
weight of the evidence by appealing to a "parol evidence rule" and
finding that a written integration exists without listening to testimony
that it does not.
42
The text of section 2-202 is susceptible to two interpretations: It
may adopt a combination of the Williston-Wigmore views or it may
adopt the more subjective Corbin theory. If the word "intended" is
interpreted to mean objectively intended, as it traditionally has been in
the law of contracts,43 section 2-202 may be nothing more than a codifi-
cation of the Wigmore-Williston theories. The first portion of section
2-202, which focuses on terms "intended by the parties as a final ex-
pression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein," can be read to adopt the Wigmore theory of partial integra-
tion. If the writing touches on the subject area of the alleged extrinsic
agreement, evidence of that agreement would be inadmissable because
the parties "intended" the writing to be final on the subject in question.
Williston's appearance test is as easily incorporated in the final part of
(b). That provision allows supplementation of the agreement by way
of "consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to
have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement." 44 According to the Williston view, if it ap-
pears final, the parties "intended" it as final. Thus if the subject mat-
ter of the extrinsic agreement is dealt with in the writing, the first part
40. 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDFNCE § 2430, at 98 (3d ed. 1940).
41. Id
42. 3 ConmN ON CoNTPacrs § 577 at 396-400 (1960).
43. See, eg., Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
44. U.C.C. § 2-202(b).
November 1978]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
of section 2-202 keeps out evidence of the extrinsic agreement; and, if
the writing appears final, the last part of section 2-202 prevents the
writing from being added to.
On the other hand, section 2-202 can just as easily be read to adopt
the Corbin view. All that is necessary to adopt the Corbin view is for
"intended" to be interpreted to mean actually, or subjectively, in-
tended. In such case, both the appearance of finality and the fact that
a particular subject has been referred to in writing could be given con-
siderable weight, but neither would be automatically decisive.
The only hint as to what the drafters intended is contained in
Comment 3: "If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they
would certainly have been included in the document in the view of the
court, then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier
of fact."'45 It can be inferred from this that evidence of the extrinsic
agreement should be considered unless there is no reasonable possibil-
ity that the parties could have made the agreement and not included it
in their writing. From the comment it thus appears that section 2-202
was probably intended to adopt an approach closely akin to that urged
by Professor Corbin.
Yet, if this is the design of the section, there is nothing in the text
to suggest it. The likely explanation for this otherwise curious omis-
sion is that it was viewed as tactically wise in gaining support for adop-
tion of the Code. Powerful commercial parties with the advantage of
preparing their own contract forms required that a strict, objective, pa-
rol evidence rule be enacted to preserve that advantage. The support
of these commercial parties was crucial in obtaining widespread enact-
ment of the Uniform Commercial Code, particularly in such commer-
cially-active states as New York.46 Thus, there emerged a clear,
45. U.C.C. § 2-202, Official Comment 3 (emphasis added).
46. Some support for this theory can be derived from the selected comments to section
15 of the Proposed Final Draft No. 1 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act (Sales Chapter of
Proposed Commercial Code), April 27, 1944. Section 15 contained a version of the parol
evidence rule substantially the same as that contained in § 2-202 of the 1962 Official Text.
The comment explained: "The question is for the court whether the oral term-real or al-
leged-was so unreasonable to omit from the particular writing that evidence on the matter
must be kept from the trier of fact. . . .The 'unless' clause of paragraph (b) [substantially
the same as (b) of 2-202] requires the taking [sic] of a distinction. It is both parties who
must have intended the writing as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms agreed
upon, and printed forms prepared by one party are not commonly so examined by the other
as to evidence the kind of intention which can properly be held to result in excluding from
the trier of fact evidence of additional terms consistent with those actually dickered about
and recorded specifically in the particular contract." No such strong interpretational gui-
dance appears in the Official Comments to § 2-202.
Another theory, not altogether inconsistent with the one advanced in the text to this
note, may explain the nebulosity of § 2-202. According to Professor David Carroll, Profes-
sor Llewellyn, and other academics, in the effort to formulate a socially balanced commer-
[Vol. 30
UNIFORMITY OF COMMERCIAL LAW
formal statement, but one of nebulous content, of the parol evidence
rule-one that eventually could be given content by the courts of the
various states.47 Although a more liberal version of the rule might
slowly evolve, in many jurisdictions the dominant objective tests of the
rule will certainly continue to have effect in the interpretation of the
section.48
Unavoidable Nonunformity
Some legal principles either inherently cannot be, should not be,
or are not yet ready to be, formulated with the degree of precision nec-
essary to obtain uniform interpretation when considered by a substan-
tial number of separate jurisdictions. A prime example of a
formulation which would seem to fit all three categories is section 2-
302, which declares:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract
or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be af-
forded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its com-
mercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
Although perhaps the concept of "unconscionability" could have been
better explained in the Official Comments than it was, 4 9 the nature and
purpose of the concept prescribe against its precise definition. It is
designed to prevent "oppression" that is not gross enough to be recog-
nized as duress, and "unfair surprise" that falls short of being legally-
recognized fraud, and thus injects into the law of contracts an enlarged
standard of decency. As a bargain-policing device, the concept is a
cial code, may have hidden a number of potentially proconsumer provisions. Section 2-202
may be one; if so, its wording survived nicely. While the comment was changed, the text
has all the potential it originally had. See Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of Which Karl N.
Llewellyn is the Hero of the Piece; or Searchingfor More Expansion Joints in Karlv' Crum-
bling Cathedral, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 139 (1970).
47. Compare Jordan v. Doonan Truck & Equip., Inc., 220 Kan. 431, 552 P.2d 881
(1976) (traditional view) with Zwierzycki v. Ownes, 499 P.2d 996 (Wyo. 1972) (liberal view).
48. See, e.g., Shoreline Properties, Inc. v. Deer-o-Paints and Chem., Ltd., 24 Ariz. App.
331, 538 P.2d 760 (1975); Jordan v. Doonan Truck & Equip., Inc., 220 Kan. 431, 552 P.2d
881 (1976); Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974); Potter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1195 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
49. See Leff, Vnconscionabiliy and the Codel-the Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 485, 487-501 (1967).
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direct descendant of the traditional concept of fraud. And as Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke so aptly said of that concept back in 1745:
The court very wisely hath never laid down any general rule beyond
which it will not go, lest other means of avoiding the equity of the
court should be found out: Therefore they always determine upon
the particular circumstances of each case; and wherever they have
found the least tincture of fraud in any of these oppressive bargains,
relief hath always been given.
50
Likewise today with the concept of unconscionability, a precise defini-
tion, if it did not invite circumvention, would at least tempt contract
drafting to the very limits of conscionability, thereby tending to defeat
its basic purpose.
This is not to say that the concept should forever be the "baseless
fabric of a vision."5' Rather as experience in its application is accu-
mulated, it should begin to acquire more precise meaning.52 Yet, it is
important that it not become rigidified. Professor Sanford Kadish's
observation concerning due process is equally applicable to unconscio-
nability: "Freezing the meaning of due process, which in the final
analysis is more of a moral command than a strictly jural precept, de-
stroys the chief virtue of its generality: its elasticity. ' 53 Flexibility is
essential if unconscionability is to achieve its purpose. Although it
must have enough content both to discourage undesirable contractual
conduct and to provide a guideline for decisionmaking, it should also,
like a chalice, remain ready to receive new content as societal attitudes
toward contractual decency change or become in need of stimulation
for change.
54
Other Article 2 sections should also remain as nebulous as the sec-
tion 2-302 doctrine of unconscionability. Among the more prominent
of these other Article 2 sections are the sections containing "reasona-
bleness" as their operative standard.5 5 Determinations of "reasonable-
ness", of course, depend on the particular circumstances of a given
50. Lawley v. Hooper, 3 Atk. 278, 279, 26 Eng. Rep. 962, 963 (1745).
51. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, Act IV, scene 1, line 151.
52. On how the concept should acquire more precise meaning, see generally Llewellyn,
Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700 (1939). While a federal code would not, and should
not, destroy the flexibility in the concept of unconscionability, it should encourage a less
random development.
53. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication, 66 YALE L.J. 319,
340-44 (1957).
54. Professor White's empirical study showed § 2-302 to have been the most frequently
cited single section in one jurisdiction surveyed and the second most frequently cited in the
second jurisdiction; the section was not enacted in California, the third jurisdiction sur-
veyed. White, supra note 15, at 1269. "Good faith" is another Article 2 concept quite
similar in this regard to unconscionability. On how the law does not and should not reflect
just social reality, but should also influence change of that reality, see Jones, The Creative
Power and Function of Law in Historical Perspective, 17 VAND. L. REv. 135 (1963).
55. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-103(l)(b), 2-305(1) & (3), 2-306(1), 2-309(1) & (3), 2-311(1), 2-
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situation.5 6 Because no two fact situations are ever the same, one
could conclude that it is inappropriate to discuss uniformity or lack of
uniformity in the context of determinations of "reasonableness." To a
very significant extent this is true; yet, detectable differences in percep-
tions of "reasonableness" in like kinds of cases are inescapable. For
example, section 2-602 requires that a rejection of goods must take
place within "a reasonable time after their delivery," or if it does not,
section 2-606 declares the occurrence of an acceptance. In CarlBeasley
Ford Inc. v. Burroughs Corporation,5 7 the seller by June had completed
delivery of an electronic accounting machine and thirteen programs.
When the machine did not perform properly, the seller made efforts to
correct the malfunction and assured the buyer in September that the
buyer's accounting records would be current by November 1. When
that failed to come to pass, on December 11 plaintiffs counsel wrote a
letter to defendant rejecting the machine. The court held "notice of
rejection, written six weeks after the November 1 date passed, was rea-
sonable."58 A somewhat stricter approach to rejection was taken in
Gardner & Beedon Co. v. Cooke.59 The goods, also apparently electri-
cal equipment, were delivered to the buyer on November 15. Finding
the occurrence of an acceptance in that case, the court declared: "This
action was commenced on December 16. . . . The difference between
the two dates, being more than 20 days, represents, in our opinion, a
reasonable time within which any inspection and rejection should have
been made of goods of the type involved here."
'60
A similar difference in definition of "reasonableness" is revealed
by cases interpreting section 2-607(3)(a) which provides, as a requisite
for recovery for breach of warranty, that "the buyer must within a rea-
sonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach
notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy." In Romedy
402(2), 2-503(1), 2-504(a), 2-508(2), 2-510(3), 2-511(2), 2-606, 2-607(3), 2-609, 2-706(1), (2) &
(3), 2-712(1).
56. There cannot and, of course, should not be a strict definition of "reasonableness."
Corbin states that "[r]easonableness is no more absolute in character than justice or moral-
ity. Like them it is an expression of the customs and mores of men-the customs and mores
that are themselves complex, variable with time and place, inconsistent and contradictory.
Nevertheless, the term is useful, giving direction to judicial research, and producing worka-
ble results." I ConIN ON CoNrATS § 1 (1963).
57. 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
58. I d at 331.
59. 267 Or. 7, 513 P.2d 758 (1973).
60. I d at 12, 513 P.2d at 760-61. The goods involved were electrical equipment. For
another rather sharp difference as to the reasonable time frame within which a rejection
must take place, compare Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d
195 (1968) with Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 120, 224
A.2d 782 (1966).
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v. Willett Lincoln-Mercury Inc. ,61 the court held, as a matter of law,
that failure by the buyer, apparently a consumer, to notify the dealer-
seller of an alleged breach of warranty for three weeks after knowledge
of the defect precluded satisfaction of section 2-607(e). 62 In Matsushita
Electric Corporation v. Sonum Corporation,63 notice by a commercial
buyer to a commercial seller within one month of acquiring knowledge
of the alleged defect was viewed as sufficient to satisfy the reasonable
time requirement of section 2-607(3).
Drafting Mishaps
When a committee engages in drafting a comprehensive piece of
legisation, some slips of the pen are inevitable. Such drafting mishaps
in the Uniform Commercial Code are of two general types. In some
instances there is simply an unnecessary lack of precision which invites
nonuniform interpretation. In other instances there is an apparent
lack of consistency which creates competing interpretational
possibilities.
One prime example of unnecessarily imprecise drafting is section
2-102, which declares the scope of Article 2: "Unless the context other-
wise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods . . . ." In
addition, most Article 2 sections are formulated to be applicable to
sales or contracts for sale. Thus, so long as a transaction involves
nothing more than a sale of goods,64 Article 2 is clearly applicable.
Yet frequently sale of goods transactions have additional dimensions.
For example, services may be an intregal part of the contract. Article 2
offers no real help in determining to which hybrid transactions it ought
to be applied, and several differences in approach have already
developed.
One approach that has been frequently applied can be described
as the "final product" test. If the final product being sold consists of
61. 136 Ga. App. 67, 220 S.E.2d 74 (1975).
62. The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant buyer because "the plaintiff
buyer, although having an opportunity to do so, failed to inspect the automobile for four or
five days after delivery, failed to notify the defendant seller of the alleged breach for three
weeks thereafter, and continued to make payments with knowledge of the defects." The
Court of Appeals held that the trial judge did not err in directing the verdict. Id at 67, 220
S.E.2d at 75.
63. 362 Mass. 246, 284 N.E.2d 880 (1972).
64. Actually, as the text indicates, § 2-102 makes Article 2 applicable to "transactions
in goods." However, many important Article 2 sections are worded so as to require an
actual sale or a contract for sale. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-305, 2-314. Others refer
specifically to buyer or seller. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-507, 2-607, 2-704, 2-712. Thus, as a
practical matter, much of the applicability of Article 2 is limited to sales of goods and con-
tracts for the sale of goods. Other sections, given their wording and the wording of § 2-102,
could apply to any type of contractual transaction involving goods such as a contract to
repair, install or lease. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-207, 2-209.
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goods, then Article 2 applies without regard to the substantial portion
of the consideration that could be attributed to the services expended in
the preparation of the final product.6 5 Other courts have attempted to
ascertain which element of the transaction, for example services or sale
of goods, is dominant from an economic point of view. For Article 2
to be applicable, one of two criteria must be met. If the dominant
economic element is a sale of goods, Article 2 will apply.66 If the con-
tract is divisible so as to separate the sale of goods dimension from the
remainder, Article 2 is applicable to the sale of goods portion.67 Still
other courts have adopted the view that any hybrid transaction sub-
stantially involving goods is subject to Article 2.68 The net result of the
differing approaches is that Article 2 has a much more expansive scope
in some jurisdictions than it does in others. As a result, there is
nonuniformity even as to what transactions the uniform law applies.
69
65. Thus, in Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1971), a contract
to supply wedding pictures was held to be within the scope of Article 2. In Lake Wales
Publishing Co. v. Florida Visitor, Inc., 335 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), a contract
for the compiling, editing, and publishing of vacation advertising pamphlets was held to be
within Article 2.
66. Thus, in For Children, Inc. v. Graphics Int'l, Inc., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1176
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), a contract to produce and print a large quantity of children's "pop-up"
books was held to be primarily a contract for the sale of services, thus not within the scope of
Article 2.
67. The failure to provide a price breakdown between labor and materials, plus the fact
that the dominant dimension of the contract was viewed to be services, led to a holding that
Article 2 was inapplicable to a contract to install an above-ground swimming pool in Gulash
v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 364 A.2d 1221 (C.P. 1975). For a decision that
might be interpreted to stand for the proposition that a hybrid transaction involving any
substantial nonsale of goods element is not within the ambit of Article 2, see J & R Elec.
Div. of J.O. Mory Stores, Inc. v. Skoog Constr. Co., 38 Mll. App. 3d 747, 348 N.E.2d 474
(1976).
68. E.g., Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 18 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 931 (7th Cir. 1976) (decided 3 months before Skoog Construction, applying Illi-
nois law, held that Article 2 applies to the construction and sale of a one-million-gallon
water tank); Port City Constr. Co. v. Henderson, 266 So. 2d 896 (Ala. Civ. App. 1972) (con-
tract to furnish labor and material in pouring a concrete slab held to be within Article 2);
Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 NJ. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (Article 2 is applicable to hair-
dresser's application of hair lotion as part of a beauty treatment); Wivagg v. Duquesne Light
Co., 73 Pa. D & C.2d 694, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 597 (C.P., Allegheny County 1975) (Article
2 applies to the supplying of electrical power).
69. While total precision would not be possible in this case, more precision is clearly
possible. It is possible that the failure to attempt formulation of more concrete guidelines in
§ 2-102 was purposeful. Opponents of the uniform-law movement frequently viewed the
effort as a threat to state sovereignty or more particularly as a threat to the right of a state to
develop its own private law. An expansive version of Article 2 could easily have been
perceived as a threat to the general contract law of the various states. For a thoughtful
discussion of the various approaches to the scope of Article 2, see Note, 9 RUT.-CAM. LJ.
303 (1978).
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One example of the type of drafting inconsistency that produces
nonuniform interpretation is present in section 2-316(2) and (3):
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must men-
tion merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous,
and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclu-
sion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all
implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that
"There are no warranties which extend beyond the description of the
face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all im-
plied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all
faults" or other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that
there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or
has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with
regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to
have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified
by course of dealing or course of performance or usage or trade.
One apparent problem70 is that what section 2-316(2) gives in the way
of the conspicuousness requirement, section 2-316(3) seems to take
away. In reading the conspicuousness requirement into (3) and
thereby refusing to interpret (3) literally, the court in Fairchild Indus-
tries v. Maritime Air Service, Ltd 7' declared:
Yet, the words "as is," even if buried in the fine print of a lengthy
document, would exclude all implied warranties. We fail to see how
this anomalous result would further the avowed purpose of §2-316 to
protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of dis-
claimer. The words "as is" are sufficient to put the buyer on notice
that there are no implied warranties, but only when they are brought
to the attention of the buyer.
72
One argument for no requirement of conspicuousness in (3) is the one
advanced by the dissenting judge in Fairchild.
70. Another problem with § 2-316 is that subsection (2) seems to say that any effective
disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability must specifically mention the word
merchantability. Subsection (3) appears to override totally that provision of subsection (2).
Compare Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Indus., Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 297, 216
N.E.2d 282 (1965) (disclaimer must specifically use word "merchantability" to be effective)
with Gilliam v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 337 So. 2d 352 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (need not mention
merchantability if "as is" is used).
71. 274 Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313 (1975).
72. Id at 187, 333 A.2d at 316-17.
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"If Parliament does not mean what it says, it must say so." . . . I
simply remain unpersuaded that the prepositional phrase "Notwith-
standing subsection (2)" with which subsection 2-316(3) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code begins means anything other than all
implied warranties are excluded when goods are sold "as is" or "with
all faults," in spite of the conspicuousness required for the exclusion
or modification of an implied warranty of merchantability or of fit-




Even when the drafting of a statutory provision is clear, some in-
terpretational mistakes are inevitable. For example, if a case is within
the ambit of section 2-201, Article 2's statute of frauds, the basic re-
quirements of subsection (1) must be met or the case must fall within
one of the four exceptions contained in the remainder of the section.
Otherwise the party claiming the existence of the contract is not enti-
tled even to introduce evidence of the existence of the contract.74 Once
73. Id at 191, 333 A.2d at 319; accord, DeKalb Agresearch, Inc. v. Abbott, 391 F.
Supp. 152 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
A similar problem is created by § 2-316 to the extent that it allows total negation of
warranty liability and by § 2-719(3) which declares: "Consequential damages may be limited
or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequent-
ial damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie uncon-
scionable." One can interpret these sections to mean (1) a seller can completely rid itself of
warranty liability but cannot simply limit the liability so as to exclude damages for personal
injuries caused by a consumer good or (2) a seller cannot completely rid itself of warranty
liability in that a seller of consumer goods is always liable when a breach of warranty results
in personal injury. Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974) (adopts first interpretation) with Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244
Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (1968) (adopts the second).
Section 2-719(2) has created problems where goods are sold with the express limitation
that the sole liability of the seller is to replace or repair defective goods. Where the seller
fails to perform this duty, some courts have denied the award of consequential damages
despite the apparent contrary language of § 2-719(2), e.g., U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Procter &
Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1972); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis
Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); while other courts have allowed buyers to resort to the
other sections of the Code, as § 2-719(2) seems to allow, e.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp.,
354 F. Supp. 423, 428 (D. Del. 1973); Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.
2d 1(1970). See Weintraub, Disclaimer of /arranties andLimitation ofDamagesfor Breach
of Warranty Under the U.C.C, 53 Tnx. L. REv. 60 (1974).
Other problems in drafting emerge in § 2-708(2), see J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 234-35 (1972), and in § 2-
612(3), particularly when compared with § 2-608(1), see Taylor, The Impact ofArticle 2 of
the UCC On the Doctrine o Antic patory Repudiation, 9 B.C. I~n. & COM. L. REv. 917, 923
n.27 (1968).
74. According to § 2-201(1) a contract for the sale of goods that does not satisfy the
statute of frauds "is not enforceable by way of action or defense."
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the statute is satisfied, the party claiming the existence of the contract is
entitled to introduce evidence to support the claim, but the burden is on
that party to establish the existence of the contract. In other words,
satisfaction of the statute does not prove the existence of the contract, it
only opens the door to introduction of evidence to prove the contract.
One example of a misinterpretation of the statute involved section
2-201(2), which declares:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in con-
firmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received
and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies
the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written
notice of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is
received.
The intended effect of this subsection is reiterated in Official Comment
3: "The only effect. . . is to take away from the party who fails to
answer the defense of the Statute of Frauds; the burden of persuading
the trier of fact that a contract was in fact made orally prior to the
written confirmation is unaffected." Section 2-201(2) does not state
that the terms of a written confirmation are themselves binding. In the
face of the wording of the section and the explanation of it in the com-
ment, the Nevada Supreme Court in Campanelli v. Conservas41tamira,
S. 75 held: "If a buyer-merchant fails to object to the written confir-
mation of an agreement from a seller-merchant, within ten days of its
receipt, the writing becomes a binding contract. . . .The 'advice of
sale' became a binding contract between the parties and they were
bound by the arbitration clause which it contained.
'76
Another, and perhaps the most frequently cited, example of a seri-
ous interpretational error is the reasoning of the court in Roto-Lith, Ltd
v. EP. Bartlett & Co.77 In that case, the common-law "last shot" doc-
trine of contract formation managed to survive despite the clear lan-
guage of section 2-207. In Roto-Lith the buyer fired the "first shot" by
ordering goods. The seller returned an acknowledgement and an in-
voice containing a clause limiting its liability to replacement of any
75. 86 Nev. 838, 477 P.2d 870 (1970).
76. Id at 841-42, 477 P.2d at 872. The same interpretational mishap has occurred
elsewhere. See, e.g., Loudon Mfg., Inc. v. American & Efird Mills, Inc., 46 App. Div. 2d
637, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 250 (1974); Trafalgar Square, Ltd. v. Reeves Brothers, Inc., 35 App. Div.
2d 194, 315 N.Y.S. 2d 239 (1970).
77. 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). This discussion of Roto-Lith is in large part a sum-
mary of Taylor, U. C C. Section 2-207 An Integration ofLegalAbstractions and Transactional
Reality, 46 U. CrN. L. REv. 419, 428-31 (1977).
Roto-Lith may well represent an example of intentional misinterpretation. In places in
the opinion, one gets the impression that the court simply could not believe that the legisla-
ture intended what it said when it adopted § 2-207. Thus, the court may have committed an
interpretational error in an effort to undo what it perceived as a drafting mishap. See 297
F.2d at 500.
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defective goods. The buyer did not respond in any way to the seller's
acknowledgement. All indications from the case are that the parties
had not had significant previous dealings with each other. The goods
were delivered, received, paid for and used. The buyer subsequently
sued to recover damages for loss caused by the alleged unmerchantabil-
ity of the goods. The seller answered that such recovery was precluded
by the limitation of liability term in the contract. The trial court di-
rected a verdict for the defendant-seller, and the decision was affirmed
on appeal. The buyer focused on section 2-207(1) and (2), arguing that
the seller's acknowledgement was a definite and seasonable expression
of acceptance, that the additional limitation of warranty liability term
was materially altering and therefore excluded by section 2-207(2)(b)
and that, therefore, the section 2-314 implied warranty of merchan-
tibility was operative in this transaction. The court, obviously influ-
enced by its common-law background, reasoned that the seller did not
intend to contract on the buyer's terms so those terms should not con-
trol the content of the contract.
To reconcile its decision with the statute the court engaged in some
tortuous interpretational gymnastics. It focused on the last clause of
subsection (1) which precludes application of the earlier acceptance
provision of that section if the "definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance" is "expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
or different terms."78 As to this last clause, the court declared: "To
give the statute a practical construction we must hold that a response
which states a condition materially altering the obligation solely to the
disadvantage of the offeror is an 'acceptance... expressly. .. condi-
tional on assent to the additional. . . terms.""1
79
In other words, the court decided that impliedly conditional can be
expressly conditional if the response is materially altering in a manner
"unilaterally burdensome" to the offeror. Following from this was the
court's conclusion that the seller's response was a counteroffer which
was accepted by the buyer when it received the goods without objec-
tion. Thus, in Roto-Lith the "last-shot doctrine" lived on in the
strange disguise of section 2-207.
Although the court was probably correct in determining that no
contract should be found under section 2-207(1), because that section
and its content-determining corollary, subsection (2), are intended to
operate only in those instances in which the agreement process is mean-
ingfully employed to produce a concurrence of intent sufficient to be
called a bargain. However, rather than characterizing the seller's re-
sponse as a counteroffer because it set out new terms unilaterally bur-
densome to the buyer, the court should have used section 2-207(3) to
78. U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
79. 297 F.2d at 500.
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determine contract formation and content. Subsection (3) presupposes
no substantially complete agreement in a bargained sense, but instead
bases contract formation on a pattern of conduct by the parties which
reflects an intent to be bound contractually, for example, delivery and
receipt of goods. As in implied-in-fact contracts generally, formation
is decided on the basis of intent derived from conduct. The problem of
contract content is addressed in the last sentence of subsection (3):
"[T]he terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which
the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary
terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act."
Thus the court in Roto-Lith, in effect, rewrote section 2-207(1) and
repealed subsection (3). Fortunately, the decision does not seem to be
producing progeny. 80
Legitimate Differences
Statutory drafting cannot provide for every contingency. As Pro-
fessor Grant Gilmore so well expressed it: "[T]here is a point beyond
which it is unprofitable for even the most resolute and ingenious drafts-
man to chase the wild goose."81  Legitimate interpretational differ-
ences are inevitable if there is not one final arbiter of the meaning of a
statute.8
2
80. See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977); Dorton v.
Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972) (both very critical of Roto-Lith,
pointing out that Roto-Lith has not been followed). But see Universal Oil Prods. Co. v.
S.C.M. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 905 (D. Conn. 1970).
Other rather clear examples of statutory misinterpretation are cases applying the § 2-
315 implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose where the defect affects ordinary
use. See, e.g., Larrance Tank Corp. v. Burrough, 476 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1970) (leaky gasoline
storage tank held not fit for the storage of gasoline); Walker v. Decora, Inc., 225 Tenn. 504,
471 S.W.2d 778 (1971) (floor that gave off offensive odor might not be fit for its particular
purpose). Other cases have made the distinction between particular purpose and ordinary
purpose. See, e.g., Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Conn.
1975); Recreatives, Inc. v. Myers, 67 Wis.2d 255, 226 N.W.2d 474 (1975). Of course, there is
a case to be made for the misinterpretation. If the distinction is made, it could prevent a
buyer from recovering against a nonmerchant seller who sells a good not fit for its ordinary
purpose. Section 2-314 would not be applicable because the seller was not a merchant.
Section 2-315 would not apply because no particular purpose was involved.
For another example of likely misinterprdtation, see Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v.
Irwin, 441 Pa. 222, 191 A.2d 376 (1963) (seems to hold that seller must have tacitly agreed to
assume liability for the particular consequential damage before buyer can recover conse-
quential damages under § 2-715).
81. 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 22.9, at 631 (1965)
82. This is not to suggest that one interpretation is not arguably better than another, i
is to suggest that reasonable people might differ on which is better. In fact, proper interpre
tational methodology will usually point to one interpretation. For an example, see notes 88
90 & accompanying text infra. On code interpretational methodology, see Franklin, On tl,
Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 330 (1951).
proper interpretational methodology were uniformly employed, this in itself would be a sij
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One such interpretational difference has developed in the applica-
tion of the buyer's revocation of acceptance remedy under section 2-
608 where the buyer continues to use the goods after giving notice of
revocation. Some courts, reasonably enough, at least from an interpre-
tational point of view, have held that such continued use precludes rev-
ocation of acceptance. That result is reached via section 2-608(3),
which contains the general declaration that "[a] buyer who so revokes
has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if
he had rejected them." Under section 2-606(l)(c) an "act inconsistent
with the seller's ownership" is an acceptance and under section 2-
607(2) acceptance precludes rejection. From this it is reasoned that the
act of continued use, because it would preclude rejection at the outset,
also precludes revocation of acceptance ifter discovery of the defect.
83
Other courts have been persuaded by the fact that nowhere in sec-
tion 2-608 is it provided that continued use after knowledge of a defect
bars revocation of acceptance. It has been held, particularly in situa-
tions where the revoking buyer continued to use the defective goods in
good faith, that continued use does not bar revocation of acceptance.84
This result is defensible conceptually under at least two theories. First,
section 2-608(3) speaks of "rights and duties," and while continued use
might be a breach of duty, there is no clear statutory mandate that the
consequence of that breach of duty be the same as continued use in the
acceptance-rejection context. Second, these cases are likely to be ex-
plainable under a traditional estoppel rationale. Where the buyer's
claim of a "substantially impairing" defect is well-grounded, it is the
seller's refusal to accept back the goods and to return the purchase
price that frequently necessitates the continued use, so the seller should
be estopped from asserting the "continued use" against the buyer.
Article 2's theory of express warranty represents another point on
which a substantial and legitimate difference in approach is develop-
ing. Under section 2-313(1) any "affirmation of fact," "description of
nificant contributor to uniformity of commercial law. The cases surveyed in preparing this
Article indicate no uniformity in methodology for interpretation of the Code. That this is
not a new phenomenon with uniform commercial legislation, is supported by the discussion
of problems of interpretation of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act in BEuTEL'S
BRA-NAN NEGOTALE INsTRumENTs LAW 80-109 (7th ed. 1948).
83. See, eg., Gigandet v. Third Nat'l Bank, 333 So. 2d 557 (Ala. 1976); Waltz v. Chev-
rolet Motor Division, 307 A.2d 815 (Del. Super. 1973); F.W. Lang Co. v. Fleet, 193 Pa.
Super. Ct. 365, 165 A.2d 258 (1960).
84. See, eg., Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or. 285, 545 P.2d 1382 (1976); Fablok Mills,
Inc. v. Cocker Machine & Foundry Co., 125 NJ. Super. 251, 310 A.2d 491 (App. Div. 1973)
(seller was the only domestic manufacturer of the type machine that buyer continued to use);
Stroh v. American Recreation and Mobile Home Corp., 35 Colo. App. 196, 530 P.2d 989
(1975) (buyer continued to occupy mobile home in which he lived after giving notice of
revocation). In Stroh the court held that the buyer's continued occupancy entitled the seller
to set off the value of the continued use against the purchase price to be returned.
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the goods," "sample or model" which becomes part of the "basis of the
bargain" is an express warranty. The paramount problem is the mean-
ing of "basis of the bargain." Under the Uniform Sales Act, to recover
on an express warranty theory the buyer had to prove reliance on the
warranty. 85 Notwithstanding a suggestion to the contrary in the Offi-
cial Comments, 86 some courts have held reliance essential in proving a
case of breach of warranty under section 2-3 13.87 This result is defen-
sible when one thinks of bargain as connoting inducement (hence
reliance).
Other courts, however, have perceived bargain as used in section
2-313 to be synonymous with contract as that term is used in Article 2,
and have held that reliance is not a requisite to recovery for breach of
express warranty. 88 Such a result is consistent with the Article 2 em-
phasis on protection of the "expectancy" interest without the necessity
of a bargained-for-exchange. 89 In other words, no particular element
85. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 12; see, e.g., Beckett v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 376 Ill. 470, 34
N.E.2d 427 (1941).
86. U.C.C. § 2-313, Official Comment 3. Use of the word "particular" with "reliance"
in that Comment does give rise to some interpretational possibilities whereby reliance would
remain a vital element in breach of express warranty cases. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 279 (1972).
87. See, e.g., Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972);
Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 Ill. App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382 (1976); Swenson v.
Chevron Chemical Co., 234 N.W.2d 38 (S.D. 1975); Terry v. Moore, 448 P.2d 601 (Wyo.
1968) (representation made after contract formed not a warranty because it induces noth-
ing); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 282 (1972).
88. Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1974) (representation made after a
sale created express warranty); Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d
281 (1974); Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Per-
haps the most daring decision to date on the matter of "basis of the bargain" is Winston
Indus., Inc. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 55 Ala. App. 525, 317 So. 2d 493 (Ct. App. 1975). In
Winston Industries, the plaintiff not only did not rely on the warranty but apparently it was
not delivered to him at the time of the sale and he did not become aware of its existence until
after the dispute over the quality of the goods arose. The court held that the warranty
issued to plaintiffs benefit. A strong dissenting opinion declared: "I am unable to deter-
mine how a warranty can be created without knowledge of its existence by the purchaser.
Creation of an express warranty requires affirmation of fact or promise by the seller to the
buyer relating to the goods, which affirmation or promise becomes part of the basis of the
bargain. Such affirmation or promise must be made known to the purchaser if it is to form
any basis for the bargain." Id at 532, 317 So. 2d at 499. To the contrary, the majority's
position is quite defensible, though their reasoning may not be. If "basis of the bargain" is
synonymous with legitimate expectancy interest, the ordinary reasonable person might well
expect to be protected by any standard warranty on the product even though he or she is
unaware of the warranty. In Winston Industries, the warranty of which plaintiff was una-
ware was a standard one that had not been delivered to him at the time of the sale. Thus it
may well be that plaintiff had a legitimate expectancy interest deserving protection under
the concept of "basis of the bargain."
89. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-209, 2-205, 2-207.
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of inducement is necessary for the creation of an express warranty. In-
stead, a reasonable expectation of such protection9 ° becomes part of the
contract and thereby affords the buyer warranty coverage.
The Code's "Uniformity"--Is It Enough?
The States' Rights Objection
Despite its pre-Code failures, the uniformity movement persisted
in using the state-by-state approach to the enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code and has continued to reject the one step ap-
proach-federal legislation. Several factors have contributed to this
choice. First, during a major portion of the uniformity movement,
Congress was dominated by rural interests which naturally were mis-
trusted by commercial interests.91 Second, Congress' track record with
complicated commercial statutes had been something less than awe in-
spiring.92 Third, considerable doubt has existed concerning the consti-
tutionality of a federal commercial code.93 This doubt stems in part
from a fourth factor, the deep-rooted, antifederalist, states' rights phi-
losophy which produced the tenth amendment. Influenced by territo-
rial instincts and a self-identity need, the states' rights philosophy
nurtures the concept that each state is unique and important unto itself.
This provincial chauvinism, while related to constitutional doubt, is an
important separate factor influencing choice of state-by-state enact-
ment over federal legislation.94
90. The expectancy interest approach to § 2-313 is not totally dissimilar to the older
reliance requirement for express warranties, for it, too, contains an element of inducement.
Ordinarily, the reasonable expectation must be induced by words or conduct of the seller.
For an exceptional case to the contrary, see the discussion of Winston Industries, note 88
supra. What is being changed is that the legally protected reasonable expectation can arise
without there being a detrimental change of position in reliance on the representation.
91. Cf. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (similar clash in apportionment
context).
92. See, eg., The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended, Title 11 of U.S.C. (1976). For
what may be evidence of current congressional potential in this area, see the proposed revi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Act, Comm'n on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Comrmuni-
cations of the Executive Director, Refport, H.R. Doc. Nos. 93-137, Part I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). Some doubt, at least, is cast on increased congressional potential by the fact that the
old Bankruptcy Act is still in effect. It is unlikely that the Bankruptcy Act of 1973 will get
out of Congress by the end of 1978. See I D. CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE
VI (2d ed. 1978).
93. See, ag., Thomas, The Federal Sales Bill as Viewed by the Merchant and the
Practitioner, 26 VA. L. REv. 537 (1940) (author favored enactment of bill). Even those who
viewed Congress as having such power at this time viewed it as being limited to interstate
transactions. See, ag., McCurdy, Unforinity andA Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L.
REv. 572 (1940).
94. The then Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court, A.B. Neil, in an article
entitled he Unform Commercial Code, 27 TENN. L. Rlv. 12 (1959), strongly opposed en-
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Because of the perceived uniqueness of each state, uniformity,
while sought, can never be totally attained. The accommodation of the
states' rights attitude requires that an overall scheme of harmony in
accord with the uniqueness of each state must be the goal. Thus local
amendments are inevitable, and there is a need to emphasize, or at least
to be free to emphasize, local interests in the application of legal princi-
ples. A fifth consideration in the continuing vitality of the states'
rights philosophy is the perception that the states' rights philosophy is
more consonant with individual liberty and is thus a buffer against the
threat of tyranny inherent in a large central government. Those em-
bracing this view fear that federal intrusion into state commercial law
could only be a step on the path to overall federal domination of the
states. Sixth, the state-by-state approach is said to provide the neces-
sary flexibility for experimentation by one state that could produce a
better means for treating a particular type of problem for all the
states.9
5
Apart from the philosophical sacrifice of states' rights interests by
enactment of a federal commercial code, the tenth amendment itself
would probably not prevent the constitutional enactment of such a
code under Congress' broad commerce power.96 The recent case of
National League of Cities v. Usery,97 indicates, as Justice Frankfurter
once said, that the tenth amendment can be "invoked not simply as a
redundant reminder that what the Constitution did not give it withheld,
but as a generating principle of restriction upon the affirmative grants
of national power."98  While National League of Cities may breathe
actment of the Code in Tennessee because: (1) It would "leave our statutory laws relating to
commercial transactions in hopeless confusion." Id at 14; (2) "Before . . .[local law is
changed] there should be an overwhelming and compelling need for it." Id; (3) The result-
ing need for new law books would be an added expense to the states and a "great expense to
the members of the bar." Id; (4) "Uniform Statutes simply will not stay uniform." Id at
15; (5) "[Ihe social and economic conditions of each state are not the same." Id at 16; (6)
It is contrary to state control over domestic problems that is "fundamental to local self-
government and individual liberty." Id at 17. Basically, Chief Justice Neil seems in part
to say that the law we have is good enough and we should not enact a code for the sake of
uniformity because uniformity is not in itself good. In fact, divergence in this context is
somehow perceived as closely related to liberty.
Although Chief Justice Neil's arguments against the Code are extreme, others have
shared thoughtfully in his concern for the threat of legal centralization on liberty. See note
95 & accompanying text infra.
95. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 200 (8th ed. 1970); Dorsen, The NationalNo-Fault Motor
Vehicle Insurance Act: .A Problem in Federalism, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 45, 48-49 (1974).
96. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942).
97. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
98. F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 40 (Quadrangle ed. 1964). Some
doubt is now cast on the following observation of Mr. Justice Stone in United States v.
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life into the tenth amendment, that amendment's new vitality is no
threat to a federal commercial code. Unlike NationalLeague of Cities,
which held that the application to state and municipal employees of a
federal minimum-wage regulation enacted under the commerce clause
violated the state's tenth amendment right "to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions," 99 a federal com-
mercial code would interfere only with the scope of private law
formulation previously controlled by state courts and legislative bodies.
Impressive support is available for such an extension of congressional
power. For example, protection against criminal acts taking place en-
tirely within one state has ordinarily been perceived as a local prob-
lem.100 Yet in Perez v. United States,0 1 the defendant was convicted
of "loan sharking" under the Federal Consumer Credit Act for making
threats of violence in collecting a debt from a local merchant. In up-
holding the conviction, the court noted that one category of problems
reached by the commerce clause was those affecting interstate com-
merce. 10 2 The court then concluded: "Extortionate credit transactions,
though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect inter-
state commerce. . . . [L]oan sharking in its national setting is one way
organized interstate crime holds its guns to the heads of the poor and
the rich alike and syphons funds from numerous localities to finance its
national operations."' 0 3 If Congress can regulate intrastate crimes that
affect interstate commerce, certainly Congress can regulate intrastate
commercial transactions which inescapably must affect the sum total of
national commerce.l °4
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941): "The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it
was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as
it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was
other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not
granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers....
From the beginning and for many years the amendment has been construed as not depriving
the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted
power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." Id at 124.
99. 426 U.S. at 852.
100. See Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92, 95 (1933).
101. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
102. Id at 150.
103. Id at 154. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 194-203 (9th ed. 1975). Mr. Justice Stewart was the lone dissenter in Perez,
urging that application of the statute in this intrastate instance contravened the ninth and
tenth amendments. 402 U.S. at 157-58.
104. No serious constitutional questions have arisen concerning the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1975), which covers a portion of that which would
be included in a comprehensive federal commercial code.
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Federal and Mixed Models
As is almost always the case with any legal goal, uniformity of
commercial law can be pursued in a number of different ways. The
choice of which way is intricately interwoven with difficult value judg-
ments balancing between conflicting themes. Varying degrees of ei-
ther uniformity or individual state power must be sacrificed depending
upon the approach selected.
One approach is a federal commercial code. Of course, such a
code would not need to go beyond those matters in which uniformity is
perceived as essential. Thus, it could leave substantial leeway for the
enactment of supplementary local rules. One method of maximizing
uniformity of the essentials of commercial law would be to limit juris-
diction in cases arising under the federal code to the federal courts.
Such a drastic shift of state power to the federal government would be
politically unattainable, perhaps philosophically unwise, and in any
event practically unfeasible because of the effect it would have on the
already overcrowded federal courts.105
A more practical variation of the federal enactment model would
be adoption of the sort of judicial jurisdictional division contained in
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.' 0 6 There jurisdiction over actions
arising under a federal statute is vested in both state and federal courts.
However, the jurisdiction of the federal courts is severely restricted by a
substantial jurisdictional amount requirement.10 7
105. On the overcrowded condition of our federal courts, see Chief Justice Burger's 1977
Report to the American Bar Association, 63 A.B.A.J. 504 (1977); Burger, Annual Report On
the State of the Judiciary, 62 A.B.A.J. 443 (1976); Burger, The State of the Judiciary, 61
A.B.A.J. 439 (1975); Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeal The Threat to
the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969); Stolz, Federal
Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions. The Needfor Additional Appellate
Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 950-59 (1976). Of course, the impact that any federal
commercial code might have on the case load of federal courts would be softened signifi-
cantly if the proposed abolition of federal diversity jurisdiction passes Congress. This pro-
posal has currently been passed in the House of Representatives. N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1978,
at B14, col. 1. However, abolition of diversity jurisdiction might destroy one of the more
significant covertly unifying forces of general law in the United States. See Thomas, The
Erosion of Erie in the Federal Courts." Is State Law Losing Ground: 1977 B.Y.L. REv. 1
(1977), where it is suggested, in a critical manner, that federal judges frequently ignore state
law in diversity cases and that this tendency is contributing to the nationalization of law in
this country. For additional support for the importance of federal diversity jurisdiction, see
Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEx. L. REv. 1, 30
(1964); Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L.
REV. 317, 330-33 (1967). Perhaps purposeful selection of the areas of law that should be
nationalized, such as commercial law, is preferable to the sort of haphazard nationalization
that is inevitable when the process occurs in diversity cases.
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1975).
107. While the statute grants concurrent jurisdiction to the federal and state courts, to be
brought in federal court the amount in controversy must equal at least $50,000 and, in addi-
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On first blush such an approach might seem insufficient to accom-
plish the desired degree of uniformity because it would still leave the
courts of the various states to interpret the code. This approach, how-
ever, would preclude local amendments on the essentials of commercial
law, and because the Code would not have to be sold on a state-by-
state basis, it is likely that more precise drafting could be accomplished
on some of the more controversial matters. Thus several important
factors contributing currently to nonuniformity would be precluded
simply by the enactment of a federal code. Unquestionably, some
nonuniformity would be produced through varying interpretations by
state courts. Yet, even the interpretationally inspired nonuniformity
might well be less than it is today if a federal code were enacted. Pro-
fessor Grant Gilmore has noted an important outgrowth of Swift v.
Tyson, s08 in which the Supreme Court held that federal courts would
apply the general law of commerce rather than state law in general
commercial law cases:
During the second half of the nineteenth century the Supreme Court
of the United States became a great commercial court: the rules
which it announced were, in nine cases out of ten, gladly followed by
the state courts as well as, of course, by the lower federal courts. A
remarkable degree of national uniformity in the law applicable to
commercial transactions was in fact achieved over a remarkably long
period of time.1°9
If a federal code rather than state law becomes the primary source of
our commercial law, it is not at all unlikely that state courts would give
considerable deference to federal court decisions.
Of course, as long as there is no ultimate arbiter of interpretational
differences, some differences are inevitable. As long as the various
state supreme courts have the final word in a vast majority of commer-
cial cases some variations in the interpretation of a federal code will be
inescapable.'10 Perhaps the number of such variations that would per-
sist under this approach would be negligible.
don, successful maintenance of a class action requires at least 100 named claimants. 15
U.S.C. § 2310 (1975).
108. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
109. Gilmore, Commercial Law in the United States: Its Codification and Other
Misadventures, in ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE COMMERCiAL LAW 449, 454 (Ziegel and Fos-
ter eds. 1969).
110. Involvement of the federal courts in the interpretation of a federal code might do
more than just contribute to uniformity. Professor White, on the basis of data gathered in
his recent empirical study of Article 2, has expressed doubt about the quality of interpreta-
tion and application of Article 2 in the three states studied. White, supra note 22, at 1278-
82. If the speculations of some are correct that federal judges are on the whole more able
than their state counterparts, expanded federal involvement should improve the quality of
interpretation and application of a commercial code. See generally Moore & Weckstein,
Diversi y Jurisdiction" Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEx. L. REv. 1, 23 (1964); Wright, The
Federal Courts and the Nature and Qualty of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317, 327 (1967).
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On the other hand, if an even higher degree of uniformity is
thought desirable, there would seem to be a way to accomplish it, and
still leave the great bulk of commercial litigation in the state courts.
While Congress has never vested general appellate jurisdiction over
state courts in any federal court other than the Supreme Court, the lan-
guage of article III suggests that there would be no constitutional prob-
lem with such a measure.1 1 Such an approach, of course, could not
guarantee uniformity from circuit to circuit, but certainly the potential
degree of nonuniformity possible under such a scheme is considerably
lessened. Furthermore, with the availability of certoriari jurisdiction
from the Courts of Appeals to the United States Supreme Court, vital
questions upon which nonuniformity between circuits had developed
could be resolved by the Supreme Court.'
1 2
Conclusion
What has happened with the Uniform Commercial Code, when
considered along with the history of earlier uniform statutes, suggests
that we are again moving toward significant nonuniformity. Because
of state-option, alternative sections and local amendments, the Code
originated with nonuniformity, and the subsequent decisional process
has evolved more and more nonuniformity, to the point of the very
multiformity that necessitated the two previous uniformity movements.
Perhaps this is the best possible course. Because of this Code's
inevitable breakdown, it guarantees another reexamination and refor-
mulation of commercial law. Each old code will periodically be re-
placed by a new streamlined uniform code. State-by-state enactment
satisfies the needs of the states' rights theme. While it does not accom-
plish uniformity, it does achieve a degree, though an ever diminishing
degree, of basic harmony.
In the quest for uniformity, the maximum of state power is pre-
served by the state-by-state enactment approach that we have now. At
the same time the degree of uniformity attained is the lowest among the
various approaches that could be described as pursuits of uniformity.
Of course, the record of the federal courts in interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code is
not unscathed. See notes 77-79 & accompanying text supra.
111. Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions.- The Needfor
AdditionalAppellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 945-48 (1976).
112. If a National Court of Appeals is established as recommended by COMMISSION ON
REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PRO-
CEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), it could be utilized to review state court
decisions based on a federal commercial code and thereby attain a high degree of commer-
cial law uniformity. For a brief description of how such a court might operate, see Rosen-
berg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 576, 591-95 (1974). But see Goldberg, There Shall Be "One Supreme
Court," 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 339 (1976).
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This is not to say that the approach does not produce an important
degree of uniformity; it does. The highest degree of uniformity has
been achieved with the simplest rules, which for one reason or another
have not been subjected to local amendment. For example, in Article
2 cases, consideration is no longer essential for the modification of a
contract. Also, unless the parties agree otherwise and unless the goods
are identified and known by the parties to be located elsewhere, the
general rule as to place for delivery under a sale of goods contract is the
seller's place of business, unless there is none, in which case it is the
seller's residence. 113 Beyond this type of rule, uniformity begins to
break down because of local amendments and the various other factors
discussed above that produce nonuniformity. Even within the break-
down, the degree of nonuniformity, at least on a per rule basis, falls
short of anything that could be described as chaotic. In fact, in a ma-
jority of instances the nonuniformity breaks down into simply a choice
between two alternatives, such as, for example, whether continued use
of goods after discovery of a defect precludes a section 2-608 revocation
of acceptance or whether it does not.114 Of course, when one figures
the number of combinations possible in light of the number of in-
stances of nonuniformity and the number of individual states, the com-
mercial law of each state appears labyrinthine. Yet there is a
substantial degree of harmony. Every Code state is operating within
the same general framework, and while a specific case might be de-
cided differently from one state to another, one who understands the
law of one state has the basis for understanding the law of the other." 5
Still, persuasive arguments can be made in favor of a federally-
enacted commercial code. Although leeway could be allowed for state
enactment of ancillary principles covering matters of local interest, the
text of the basic commercial code would be one throughout the nation,
making commercial law more readily known and more predictable for
business interests. Multi-state business would certainly prefer to use
one form and confront only one body of law. Theoretically, a federal
code should be a benefit to commerce, which in turn should contribute
to overall commercial prosperity. The federal approach would also
fulfill the psychological need for symmetry, which is certainly as strong
113. U.C.C. § 2-308.
114. See notes 83-84 & accompanying text supra.
115. If the present course is continued, more honesty about the true nature of the ap-
proach would be refreshing. Perhaps "uniform" should be replaced by "moder' in the title
of the Code. Certainly, the change made by Louisiana in its version of § 1-201 is a contri-
bution to honesty and would be in order for all the states. The Louisiana version of § I-
201(2)(c) declares: "The purposes and policies of this Title are... to promote uniformity of
the law among the various jurisdictions." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-102(2)(c) (West
Supp. 1978). The Official Text declares the purpose and policy to be "to make uniform the
law among the various jurisdictions."
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as some of the psychological needs inherent in the states' rights theme.
In addition, a federal code would reprsesent recognition of the fact that
in a vast majority of commercial cases the "reasonable expectations" of
a citizen of one American state are the same as those of a citizen of
another state. This, of course, is increasingly the case, given the steady
and dramatic rise in the mobility of our citizenry. Finally, a federal
code seems to be an idea with history on its side. Though private law
remains to a substantial extent a bastion of the states, the trend of this
century in American legal history has been toward more and more cen-
tralization. As Professor Lawrence Friedman so aptly put it: "Inter-
nally, this has been an age of central, national power. The relative
strength of the states has melted away; the federal government has
grown to a giant size. The federal Caesar fed on the meat of social
upheaval, the two great wars and the cold war, a vast depression and a
technological revolution."'1 16 Thus it may be that the time for a federal
commercial code has arrived.
116. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 567 (1973).
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